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Abstract: Non-human animals face significant risks in meteorological, geological, technological, and terrorist 
disasters. A large network of rescue organizations and policies has developed in response to the needs of 
animals. This paper examines the animal response system through four case studies, revealing issues and 
conflicts that can inform animal rights policy and activism. The first case examines the response to Hurricane 
Katrina, pointing out that emergency response plans reflect speciesist assumptions that give human lives 
priority, in all circumstances. The media highlighted accusations of racism during the Katrina response, but 
activists need to educate the public about the connections between these forms of discrimination. Second, a 
train derailment in which residents evacuated without their animals resulted in a bomb threat on the animals’ 
behalf. Faced with negative publicity, responders conducted a rescue operation, proving that the government 
responds selectively to direct action. Third, Hurricane Charley revealed a myth about the behavior of dogs that 
has parallels to myths about direct action on behalf of animals. Understanding how myths function can help 
activists undermine them. Finally, an evacuation exercise at an animal shelter emphasized the importance of 
training volunteers in the handling of animals. This lesson translates well to animal liberation actions and 




The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) estimates that natural or 
technological disasters affect two to three million Americans every year. Any incident that 
affects humans is likely to affect animals, as well. For example, animal welfare organizations 
cared for an estimated 10,000 companion animals affected by Hurricane Katrina, which was 
only the first of the three American hurricanes of 2005. Over three million animals 
(companion animals and livestock) died in Hurricane Floyd in 1999. After the Asian tsunami, 
the media offered stories of how some animals fled to higher ground and some performed 
acts of heroism. However, the reality for the majority of animals seldom made the news. 
One month after the tsunami, the Humane Society International estimated the stray dog 
population on Phuket at 17,000. Six months after the disaster, rescue workers were still 
trying to provide care for thousands of starving dogs, cats, livestock, marine mammals, and 
other animals. Other examples abound. Thirty thousand cattle died in the Colorado blizzard 
of 1997. In the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew in 1992, anecdotal reports indicate that over 
1000 healthy dogs and cats were euthanized merely for lack of space in which to house them.  
This paper uses four case studies to highlight issues in disaster response that have 
relevance for animal rights activists. The first case draws on my experience in the response 
to Hurricane Katrina. Although the response brought numerous issues to public attention, I 
focus on the speciesist assumptions inherent in disaster response policy as well as in the 
irresponsible keeping of companion animals. The next case uses secondary data from survey 
research on the evacuation of companion animals following a train derailment and chemical 
spill in Weyauwega, Wisconsin. The accident brought attention to the need to evacuate 
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companion animals along with residents and exposed conflicts between citizens and the 
quasi-military authority structure of the responders. The incident raises issues pertinent for 
animal liberators, especially concerning government justifications for keeping people out of 
particular areas. The third case study employs research I conducted following Hurricane 
Charley in 2004. The incident presented Florida’s animal welfare organizations and 
companion animal guardians with the first major evacuation challenge since Hurricane 
Andrew. Although much had improved for animals in the intervening years, a new problem 
emerged. A “disaster myth” about dog behavior resulted in the shooting of a “dangerous” 
dog by police officers. The incident serves as a reminder of the justifications governments 
will offer for the use of violence and of the power that myths have over behavior. The 
fourth, and final, case study reports on a disaster exercise at an urban animal shelter. The 
exercise revealed problems with the use of untrained volunteers, who inadvertently pose 
additional risks for the welfare of the animals they intend to protect. This case offers a 
valuable lesson about the need for training and experience among those involved in actions 
on behalf of animals.  
 
Providing for Animal Welfare within Disaster Response  
 
During the last decade, emergency response agencies have gradually begun to include 
animals in their disaster response plans. Following Hurricane Floyd, for example, the major 
public and private animal stakeholders in North Carolina developed a cooperative response 
plan. Other states, such as Colorado, have developed their own animal response plans based 
on North Carolina’s model. Through memoranda and statements of understanding with 
FEMA and the Red Cross, various animal welfare agencies serve as the designated animal 
responders following disasters. National and international organizations such as the Humane 
Society of the United States, Humane Society International, the American Humane 
Association, Code 3 Associates, Noah’s Wish, and Emergency Animal Rescue Services 
deploy their disaster programs to stricken areas at the request of an affected state. National 
veterinary organizations, such as the American Veterinary Medical Association, can deploy 
the Veterinary Medical Assistance Team (VMAT) to help restore disrupted veterinary 
infrastructures.1 Large numbers of trained and untrained volunteers typically assist these 
organizations in their disaster response work.  
In May 2006, the U.S. House of Representatives approved the Pets Evacuation 
Transportation and Standards (PETS) Act (H.R. 3858), which will require states to include 
companion and service animals in disaster planning. The Senate version of the Act (S. 2548; 
vote pending) would authorize FEMA to aid in developing such plans. However, 
considering the incompetence of government during Hurricane Katrina, the PETS Act is 
little more than a public relations strategy. Local and national activists and animal welfare 
agencies, as well as other animal stakeholders, will continue to carry out the work, using 
donations and volunteer labor. Federal legislation regarding animal welfare in disasters goes 
nowhere without volunteers and activists. Indeed, legislation makes the government appear 
responsible, but it is little more than a mandate for welfare organizations to do more of what 
they have long done in disasters. The advantage of the PETS Act comes through requiring 
that responders recognize the importance of the bond between humans and companion 
animals. The National Guard and other rescuers will no longer be allowed to insist that 
people leave their animals behind, as in Hurricane Katrina. This is indeed a positive step, but 
only for companion animals. Although a discussion of farmed animals lies beyond the scope 
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of this paper, I must mention that this legislation does nothing for the millions of animals 
who die when disasters strike confinement feeding operations and research labs.  
Beyond mandates that acknowledge the human-animal bond, the involvement of 
government in the animal response following disasters raises serious concerns about 
effectiveness. FEMA’s ineptitude following Katrina is widely recognized. Although many 
contributing factors are to blame, one source of the problem is the structure used in disaster 
response. When a disaster occurs, the response is organized through an administrative 
structure known as an incident command system, or ICS. The ICS, also known as the 
“command and control” model, has its roots in military organizations that were the model 
for civil defense systems, which constituted the first comprehensive emergency planning in 
the U.S. (see Wenger 1990; Dynes, 1994; Drabek & McEntire, 2003). The ICS model has 
numerous advantages that make it efficient and economical; most notably, it uses standard 
operating procedures and a consistent division of labor. The Incident Commander 
establishes a command post from which to manage the ICS hierarchy. The Incident 
Commander has a command staff consisting of a Liaison Officer, who coordinates the 
activities of the responding groups, such as police, fire, animal control, and Red Cross; a 
Public Information Officer, who authorizes the release of information to the public and the 
media; and a Safety Officer, who is responsible for the safety of responders and the public. 
On the next level of the ICS are the four parts of the general staff, who oversee Operations, 
Planning, Logistics, and Finance.  
The formal structure of the disaster response system includes agencies at the local, 
state, and federal levels. The precise composition of these agencies can vary. Some, such as 
FEMA, have a core group of full-time professionals who are assisted in operations by on-call 
volunteers. State and local agencies usually have smaller staffs, which serve in other 
capacities, such as fire fighters. In addition, trained private citizens are often activated to 
assist local jurisdictions. During a disaster, the response begins at the bottom, with local 
governments mobilizing first. Local responders communicate with state governments, which 
then communicate with the federal government if needed. Federal agencies, such as FEMA, 
provide financial and technical support to state and local agencies, which remain in charge of 
the response (see Schneider 1992).  
The command and control model operates under several assumptions about the 
nature of disasters, the existence of a human-animal hierarchy, and the place of experts in 
the response. At the policy level, animal rights activists need to understand the assumptions 
underlying the command and control model. Activists involved in disaster response can use 
their knowledge of these assumptions to inform their participation and challenge the existing 
system. At the grassroots, on-the-ground level, activists involved in raids, sabotage, and 
large-scale direct actions should understand the assumptions guiding law enforcement and 
emergency responses to their actions.2 
 The first of these assumptions concerns the failure of existing social norms and 
structures in disasters. The very notion of command and control “assumes that emergencies 
create a severe disruption in social life which lowers the effectiveness of individual behavior 
and reduces the capacities of social systems” (Dynes 1983, 657-8). The ICS steps in to play 
the role of a strong authority that can prevail over the putative chaos wrought by the 
disaster. In this way, the command and control model’s assumption of chaos represents an 
example of how institutional “thinking,” to use Mary Douglas’s (1986) metaphor, shapes the 
ameliorative services that disaster response organizations deliver (see also Holstein and 
Miller 1993; Miller and Holstein 1989). The metaphor of institutional thinking describes how 
organizational activities and discourse reproduce particular definitions of and solutions to 
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social problems. From an organization’s perspective, a solution “is only seen to be the right 
one if it sustains the institutional thinking that is already in the minds of individuals as they 
try to decide” (Douglas 1986:4; emphasis added).  
Because institutional thinking can only frame problems selectively, the proffered 
solutions often fall short of addressing the problems as experienced by those outside the 
institution’s purview. In other words, institutional thinking overlooks relevant aspects of the 
situation or circumstances that are salient for those experiencing the problem. As Loseke 
(2001) argues, institutional formulations may not capture the complexities of lived 
experience. This failure leads to “discursive disjunctions” between incompatible systems of 
meaning (Chase 1995, 123). An example appeared in Hurricane Katrina, when rescuers 
forced people to leave their companion animals. Residents faced the choice between leaving 
animals they considered family members and risking their own lives. Because of institutional 
thinking, new problems may emerge later, through the cracks of the “organizationally 
embedded” solutions (Gubrium 1992; see also 1987). As I explain later, disaster myths about 
dogs in the aftermath of Hurricane Charley offer a good illustration of this.  
 In addition to the pitfalls of institutional thinking, the disaster response system, at 
least as currently practiced through the command and control model, reveals thoroughgoing 
speciesism and a paternalistic attitude about the right to use force and violence. To be sure, 
the command and control model should not be singled out for accusations of speciesism; 
our entire anthropocentric culture is to blame. The point I focus on here concerns the 
speciesist assumptions that direct emergency responders to save human lives first, and often 
at the expense of animal lives. Coupled with this, the use of state-sanctioned force and the 
threat and reality of violence poses an intriguing paradox for animal rights activists. For 
example, following Hurricane Katrina, the lack of government response required subsequent 
animal rescuers to engage in tactics such as breaking and entering, which are denounced 
when engaged in by the Animal Liberation Front (ALF). For a deeper exploration of these 




Case #1: Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans, Louisiana 
 
The unprecedented catastrophe of Hurricane Katrina highlights numerous issues related to 
animal liberation and welfare. Although many stages in the response could provide critical 
and analytical points of departure, I limit the discussion to an aspect with which I have first-
hand experience: the housing of companion dogs rescued from New Orleans (see Irvine 
forthcoming). Along with three staff members from a local humane society at which I 
volunteer, I assisted for a week in the overwhelming task of caring for the more than 2000 
dogs housed at the Lamar-Dixon Expo Center in Gonzales, Louisiana (about 60 miles 
northwest of New Orleans).3 The Humane Society of the United States (HSUS) leased 
Lamar-Dixon as the primary staging area for the New Orleans animal response.4 At that 
time, Lamar-Dixon was the largest functioning animal shelter in the United States. 
Conditions in the field were extremely taxing, and I succumbed to heat exhaustion during 
my stay. Among the many insights that the experience afforded me, two stand out as 
particularly relevant for this paper. The priority placed on human lives, a basic tenet of 
disaster response, essentially created a second disaster, in the form of the overwhelming 
numbers of homeless animals needing rescue, housing, and veterinary care. The more basic 
issue however, and the one that has not entered the conversation about legislating animals 
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into disaster response plans, is the speciesism implicit in the belief that companion animals 
are a basic entitlement. Having one or more dogs, cats, or both is practically a birthright, 






Katrina made landfall on August 29, 2005. It is widely known that in the flooding that 
followed, many of the residents who evacuated New Orleans left their companion animals 
behind. Many people did so because they were going to motels that would not accept 
animals. Others, rescued in boats, helicopters, and emergency vehicles, report that 
responders insisted that they would only take people. Some residents were forced, under 
threat of arrest, to abandon their dogs and cats. Evacuees who went to emergency shelters 
had to find alternative arrangements for their animals, as most shelters do not accept non-
human animals.5 In many emergencies, some animal shelters will house companion animals 
temporarily. As I explain below, this practice worked well during Hurricane Charley in 2004. 
However, Katrina’s floodwaters destroyed the Louisiana Society for the Prevention of 
Cruelty to Animals in New Orleans.6 Residents who managed to bring their dogs and cats to 
the Convention Center were forced to leave them behind when they evacuated that facility, 
simply because animals are not permitted on public transportation. Numerous media 
accounts depict National Guardsmen simply letting dogs and cats run free as their guardians 
watched helplessly.7 One of the most famous—and heartbreaking—images from the disaster 
depicts the little white dog named “Snowball” being torn from a boy’s arms by a police 
officer as the boy boarded a bus to leave the Superdome. Video showed the boy so upset 
that he vomited. The officer separated the dog and boy to uphold the policy that prohibits 
animals on public transportation. Evacuees reported being told that their animals would be 
rescued later, and some thought they could soon return for their animals themselves. As is 
now widely known, some residents have never returned.  
As Katrina approached, animal response teams from all over the country were 
staging near Baton Rouge. However, police and military blockades prohibited animal 
rescuers from entering New Orleans for six days following the flood. Once rescue teams 
could enter the city, rescuers caught and transported animals to Lamar-Dixon, where they 
received veterinary examinations and treatment, decontamination baths (if needed), and 24-
hour care, albeit at the most basic level. The vast majority of the animals housed at Lamar-
Dixon were dogs. They received food, water, and a clean kennel every day, but walks were a 
luxury available only if we had additional volunteers. The minimal paperwork taped to the 
kennels told the location of rescue. The record of one especially sad dog described her 
rescue from a house where the other two dogs had died, most likely of heat, thirst, and 
starvation. Most of the dogs were mixed breeds, and most had nice dispositions, especially 
considering what they had endured. All were thin. Many were sick. Many had mange and 
diarrhea. Most male dogs were intact, and numerous females were in heat. For security 
reasons, the Lamar-Dixon management insisted that the lights remain on in the facility 
overnight. Consequently, the animals had no natural day and night. The relentless heat and 
humidity took a toll on the dogs as well as the volunteers.8 
Volunteers worked around the clock, as vehicles continually arrived with rescued 
animals. The greatest number of animals arrived after dark, once the curfew in New Orleans 
forced rescue teams to leave the city. When I first arrived, the facility was terribly 
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overcrowded because the state veterinarian would not allow dogs to be transferred to 
shelters outside Louisiana. Within the week, however, dogs who had been unclaimed since 
the flood could be transferred out of state, while newly rescued animals had to remain within 
Louisiana for a designated time to allow guardians a chance to locate them. After a transfer 
of dogs, the newly empty kennels gave volunteers momentary false hope. Just moments after 
a truckload of dogs departed for other shelters, new ones arrived by the dozens from the 




The overwhelming numbers of homeless animals after Katrina highlighted the speciesist 
assumptions in the disaster response. Emergency responders make human lives their first 
priority. Fire fighters, police officers, and other first responders will not rescue a dog or cat 
instead of a human being.9 This policy draws a line between different kinds of life, and 
assumes that the lives on the human side of the line are more valuable. The debate about the 
relative value of lives is, I believe, misguided. The speciesism inherent in the construction of 
a human-animal boundary assumes that rescue cannot be reinvented in such a way that can 
spare the lives of animals and humans. The policy of putting humans first inhibits thinking 
about disaster response “outside the box,” as it were. If disaster response policy were 
examined with an eye to eliminating speciesist assumptions, small changes could improve the 
situation for people and animals. For example, in a conversation I had with a veterinarian 
volunteer about six months after Katrina, I learned that Red Cross responders are not 
permitted to carry dog and cat food in their vehicles. This particular veterinarian had traveled 
through New Orleans in Red Cross vehicles several times as part of his service, during a time 
early in the response when travel in the city was restricted to emergency vehicles. He pointed 
out the need for dog and cat food at his site, and requested that the Red Cross bring some 
on their next trip. The responders told him that they were prohibited from carrying animal 
feed or animals. The veterinarian explained that the food was human-grade, securely 
packaged, and unlikely to cause any contamination of any sort. The rule prevailed. Hundreds, 
perhaps thousands, of dogs and cats starved because emergency vehicles were reserved for 
human needs. Only once animal response teams were allowed in the city could food be made 
available to stranded and stray animals.  
In the rescue efforts, animal response teams broke into evacuated homes, smashing 
doors and windows and using the same tactics that the ALF uses to rescue farmed and lab 
animals. In both cases, the rescuers offered the same justification for their actions, claiming 
that the animals were suffering and that saving them trumped any rights to property. 
However, in the Katrina response, the state had in effect granted permission for rescuers to 
engage in breaking and entering. Companion animals have a different status than those 
confined in labs and on farms (as demonstrated by their inclusion in the PETS Acts). 
Moreover, the public, once aware of the plight of the abandoned dogs and cats, supported 
the rescue effort. The violence was state sanctioned to compensate for the government’s 
incompetence in the response. In contrast, ALF actions are on behalf of animals who are 
generally invisible to and forgotten by the public. To protect corporate interests, the 
government portrays ALF activists as terrorists rather than rescuers. The significant point is 
that the cases are similar in the most important respects, highlighting the arbitrariness of the 
laws that demonize liberation as terrorism. The Katrina response can potentially inform 
people about what liberation is and why it is necessary.  
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During the response to Katrina, charges of racism surfaced regularly in the media, 
but the Katrina response also demonstrated rampant speciesism, and the links between the 
two forms of discrimination became real as dogs from poor, predominantly African 
American parishes crowded into Lamar-Dixon. Although steps such as challenging the 
human-animal boundary on the response end could improve the situation for animals, there 
are additional speciesist assumptions at work on a more basic level in the practice of keeping 
dogs and cats as companions. In the interest of full disclosure, I will admit that my cat and 
dog companions surround me as I write this. Nevertheless, I believe that, in a morally just 
world, we would not reproduce other species to keep for our companionship.10 Before we 
humans reach that stage of moral maturity, we must ask serious questions about the risks to 
which we expose companion animals when we keep them in our homes.  
Most of the animals at Lamar-Dixon came from parishes in which heavy flooding 
was anticipated early on in the incident. These parishes were also mostly lower-income areas, 
where residents had few resources to evacuate on their own. Because the practice of keeping 
animals as companions is taken for granted, regardless of the hazards to which people might 
expose the animals, thousands of dogs and cats were abandoned when their human 
guardians were rescued. This raises a political minefield of a question:  should people who 
have few resources to insure their own safety also put animals at risk? The question smacks 
of middle-class privilege, and I want to be clear that I am not saying the poor are incapable 
of caring for animals. Rather, I want to raise the issue that incorporating animals into disaster 
response is a positive step, but more basic steps in educating people about responsible 
guardianship might go further to reduce the hazards that animals face in future disasters. 
“Responsible” guardianship must go beyond simply providing food, water, and shelter. It 
must involve acknowledging a lifelong commitment, and fighting against threats to that 
commitment. The experience of losing a companion animal in Hurricane Katrina should 
have compelled New Orleans residents, particularly African-Americans, to activism on 
behalf of animals. However, most people seem content to believe that the government has 
allegedly solved the problem of animals in disasters. Time will most likely reveal that 
exclusively human interests once again prevail. 
 
Case #2: Chemical Spill, Weyauwega, Wisconsin 
 
Self-reliance on the part of the public is an essential capacity in effective disaster preparation. 
Emergency managers recommend that people take the initiative to have supplies on hand to 
provide for all members of the household for at least 72 hours. For small animals such as 
cats and dogs, this means having sufficient food, water, collars, leashes, and identification, 
litter, bedding, medications, and other necessities. For cats and small dogs, it also means 
having carriers for transportation and housing. Moreover, because Red Cross shelters that 
provide emergency housing for people do not allow animals, it means prearranging 
accommodations with friends, family, or in motels away from the disaster area. In short, 
considerable individual and household initiative is expected during the response to a disaster. 
Yet, in the event of an actual evacuation order, individuals must yield to the authority and 
expertise of emergency managers. In a train derailment in Wisconsin, these conflicting 
expectations compromised public and animal safety in ways that, if engaged in by animal 





At 5:30 a.m. on March 4, 1996, 35 cars of a train derailed while passing through Weyauwega, 
Wisconsin. Fifteen of the train’s cars carried propane, and five of these caught fire. At 7:30 
a.m., residents of Weyauwega’s 1022 households were ordered to evacuate because of 
concern for an explosion, and electricity and gas were cut off to reduce further hazards. 
Emergency managers anticipated that the response would take several hours. The effort 
instead took over two weeks, reflecting the unpredictability of disaster response. Among the 
241 households that included companion animals, fifty percent of the residents left their 
animals behind.11 Residents who were not at home at the time of the order to evacuate had 
little choice. Shortly after the evacuation, forty–percent of companion animal guardians 
reentered the evacuation zone illegally to rescue their companion animals, at considerable 
risk to their own safety. Following protocol, emergency managers prevented residents from 
attempting to enter their own homes. A group of citizens made a bomb threat on behalf of 
the animals. As anyone familiar with animal rights actions knows, this attracted considerable 
media attention. Four days after the evacuation, the Emergency Operations Center 
organized an official companion animal rescue, supervised by the National Guard and using 




The Weyauwega disaster shows how institutional thinking shapes the ameliorative services 
that emergency responders deliver. As one disaster researcher puts it, “success and failure in 
disaster recovery is almost entirely a matter of public perception rather than objective reality. 
Private citizens cannot be expected to comprehend fully the difficulties and complexities 
involved in any recovery effort. At the same time, people are naturally absorbed with their 
own personal problems caused by the disaster” (Schneider 1992, 143). From within the 
paternalistic purview of emergency response, the ICS is the new social structure, put in place 
because existing structures will purportedly disintegrate. According to the new rules, citizens 
must obey orders to evacuate. The lives of residents and responders have priority over 
property, which includes companion animals, at least at the present. However, from the 
public’s perspective, it is a resident’s prerogative to evacuate or not, or even to decide when 
to reenter after leaving. 
The self-reliance and initiative that facilitates successful response was put to work in 
the bomb threat, rather than in preparation. Only 2.5% of the companion animal-owning 
households indicated that they had a disaster plan prior to the train derailment, but 41% had 
made such a plan following the incident. More importantly, the use of the National Guard 
challenged resources that could have gone to other uses. The Weyauwega incident reveals 
that residents who do not evacuate with their companion animals could adversely affect the 
health and safety of many other people and animals during disasters. Hurricane Katrina 
provided further evidence of this, adding to the existing documentation of the importance of 
evacuating companion animals along with residents (Heath et al. 1998, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c).  
The actions of the companion animal guardians who illegally rescued their animals 
points out the risks of discursive disjunctions between incompatible systems of meaning. 
One animal response director put the disjunction this way: “The public may think the 
question surrounding companion animals in disasters is, ‘will you risk your life for your 
companion animals?’ However, the question really is ‘will you risk someone else’s life for your 
companion animals?’’ (Kevin Dennison, personal communication). This is further 
illustration of the speciesist assumptions of disaster response: human lives come first. 
Framing disaster response in terms of whose life is more valuable makes it unlikely that 
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response policy will move beyond the human-animal dichotomy to create ways to meet the 
needs of all life.  
 
Case #3: Hurricane Charley, Southwest Florida 
 
“Disaster mythology” (Wenger et al. 1975) refers to the numerous misapprehensions people 
hold about behavior during and after a disaster (see Fischer 1988a, 1988b, 1998). One 
researcher explains the myths about disaster behavior in this way:  
 
[Victims] are expected to flee in panic, suffer from psychological dependency and 
disaster shock. It is often believed that evacuation of these people must not be called 
too soon for fear of causing massive flight behavior. It is believed that shelters 
overflow beyond capacity with organizers unable to deal with the mob mentality. 
Both survivors and those converging to the scene are believed to be driven by base, 
depraved instincts. These individuals are commonly perceived as likely to loot 
property, price gouge on another, and generally behave in other selfish ways—most 
of which are imagined to spread from individual to individual in a contagious fashion 
(Fisher 1998, 13).  
 
Disaster researchers have established that the public believes in disaster myths and the mass 
media facilitates their beliefs (see Fisher 1998 for a review). Although looting and price 
gouging do occur following disasters, instances are relatively few, and media coverage is 
usually based on third-party reports.12 Simply put, “the perceived tendency for the depravity 
of mankind to emerge during disasters is not supported by the evidence” (Fischer 1998, 18).  
In contrast, research reveals “very little panic or anti-social behavior during the 
immediate response period. Instead, there is an outpouring of concern on behalf of victims 
and the affected community (Drabek and McEntire 2003, 107). However, emergency 
responders are aware of disaster myths and must take steps to convince the public that they 
are safe. The National Guard is deployed to protect against looting and Incident 
Commanders often establish curfews. Myths affect the behavioral response to disaster. 
Researchers have found, for example, that significant numbers of people refuse to evacuate 
their homes for fear of looting (Dynes and Quarantelli 1975; Perry, Lindell, and Greene 
1981). After Hurricane Charley, I saw many homes in Port Charlotte and Punta Gorda 
spray-painted with messages of “Don’t loot or I’ll shoot.” Alongside the myths about looting 
and price gouging, Hurricane Charley revealed what I call the myth of “the dangerous dog 
pack.” This myth has implications for the treatment of animals displaced by disasters and for 
direct action on behalf of animals. 
 
The Event  
 
Hurricane Charley hit southwest Florida early in the afternoon of August 13, 2004. The 
storm was rated category four, having winds up to 145 miles per hour. Charley made landfall 
in the city of Punta Gorda, in Charlotte County. Over two million people were evacuated 
and the damage was extensive, estimated at over three billion dollars. I conducted 
ethnographic research and interviews in Charlotte County, Florida, immediately following 
Hurricane Charley in August 2004 (Irvine 2004a). I visited the Suncoast Humane Society, 
which served as the primary staging area for animal response during the hurricane, and the 
Animal Welfare League, which sustained heavy damage during the storm. I interviewed key 
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members of the response team and conducted field conversations with staff members and 
volunteers. The objectives of the study were to describe the organizational response 
concerning animals and to compare the post-Charley situation for animals with that of 
Hurricane Andrew in 1992.  
The destructive force of Hurricane Charley resulted in numerous problems for 
companion animals and animal stakeholders. The storm damaged or destroyed several local 
veterinary hospitals. Charlotte County requested assistance from the VMAT to restore the 
veterinary infrastructure. The storm tore the roof off the Animal Rescue League of Charlotte 
County. Prior to the storm, Charlotte County Animal Control (assisted by Charlotte County 
Volunteer Animal Rescue Committee) had evacuated all the dogs (about one hundred) from 
the shelter to a fire training tower east of Punta Gorda, where they were housed in kennels 
with three days worth of food and water. All cats had been placed in foster care, many with 
staff and volunteers. On August 14, the HSUS Disaster Animal Rescue Team arrived with 
about two dozen volunteers and immediately set up a temporary center in Punta Gorda. The 
HSUS facility cared for lost and injured animals and arranged transport to Suncoast Humane 
Society in Englewood, about fifteen miles away. On August 14, Suncoast transferred its 
adoptable animals (about 100 cats and 50 dogs) to other Florida shelters to make room for 
animals displaced by the hurricane. Suncoast also housed the dogs who had weathered the 
storm in the fire tower. Some residents who suffered significant losses found that they could 
no longer provide a home for their companion animals and had to surrender them to the 
Humane Society. Suncoast transferred all animals surrendered by their guardians to shelters 
in other areas of the state. The shelter kept animals who were lost and found during the 
hurricane for longer than the usual period before becoming adoptable, to facilitate reunions 
with guardians. Suncoast took reports of lost animals, and all facilities tried to match reports 
with found animals in order to reunite animals with their human families.  
Alongside the myths about looting and price gouging, Hurricane Charley revealed 
the myth of “the dangerous dog pack.” This refers to the belief that stray dogs will band 
together and attack people. In Charlotte County, one woman reported being bitten by a stray 
dog. Coincidentally, several dogs were seen traveling together in the vicinity. The police 
assumed the dogs were guilty. They shot and injured one dog, who then ran off. Animal 
control officers later caught the dog and took him to Suncoast Humane for treatment. He 
awaited adoption at the time of this research (appropriately named “Bullet”). However, local 




Like all myths, the “dangerous dog pack” contains some wisdom. Dogs and other animals 
can carry rabies and other zoonotic diseases. It makes good sense to avoid handling an 
unfamiliar dog or cat, especially one that appears frightened. But in a short-term disaster 
such as a hurricane, animals who were companions only two or three days earlier are not 
likely to have so quickly reverted to a savage state of nature. In an uncertain situation, one 
bite implicated all dogs, and fortunately, only one animal suffered. The fate of animals in 
larger scale disasters such as the tsunami is less positive. The Sri Lankan military was 
prepared to kill thousands of homeless dogs if even a single case of rabies occurred. Six 
months after the disaster, the Humane Society International team was still engaged in efforts 
to educate officials about the benefits of spaying, neutering, and vaccinating over 
eradication. In addition to being morally reprehensible, killing campaigns are also ineffective. 
The killers never catch all the dogs, who flee at the hint of danger. Dogs then populate other 
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areas, where they continue to breed. The two organizations face a discursive disjunction as 
they negotiate the meaning and value of homeless animals. The myth of the dangerous dog 
pack empowers the government to engage in public relations efforts to show members of 
the public that they are safe.  
Disaster myths have a parallel in animal rights activism, particularly direct action. For 
example, similar myths shape the way the government, corporations, and the public 
understand direct action on behalf of animals.13 Equating direct action with terrorism creates 
the impression that it always involves violence and intends at intimidation. The equation of 
the two in the media shapes public perceptions. Members of the public begin to believe that 
they are vulnerable to violence committed by animal rights activists. Consequently, any direct 
action will elicit state-sanctioned force and violence, not because the action itself was violent, 
but because the public, as well as the police and other responders, believe the myth. Even if 
the responders understand the action correctly, they will be required to take drastic action as 
a public relations move, to demonstrate that citizens are protected from “terrorism.”  
 
Case #4: Disaster Exercise, Aurora, Colorado 
 
Another common occurrence contradicts the myth that disasters bring out the worst in 
people. During a disaster, well-meaning but untrained volunteers, unaffiliated with any 
response agency, will gravitate to the site. Some people will want to help with rescue and 
recovery, while others will bring sandwiches or snacks. Due to insurance regulations, disease 
control and safety measures, response protocols, and most tellingly, due to the ICS’s inability 
to integrate them, untrained volunteers pose a tremendous liability in any incident. They also 
represent an extraordinary untapped resource. The handling of what responders refer to as 
“SUVs,” or “Spontaneous Untrained/Unsolicited Volunteers,” is one of the most 
challenging public relations issues in a disaster. It also represents an area in which the gap 
between institutional thinking and lived experience is wide. As one emergency manager puts 
it: 
When disaster—natural or man-made—strikes a community, specific emergency 
management and nonprofit organizations automatically respond according to a pre-
established plan. Each of these designated organizations has a specific role to play to 
ensure an effective response to and recovery from the disaster’s devastation. Yet one 
element within the present system continues to pose a challenge: spontaneous, 
untrained volunteers . . . the paradox is clear: people’s willingness to volunteer versus 




In a dual role of volunteer on the State Animal Response Team (a non-governmental 
agency) and researcher, I observed an emergency training exercise at an animal shelter in 
Aurora, Colorado, the state’s third largest city. The exercise illustrates a potential problem 
with SUVs in the animal shelter context and in any situation involving the handling of 
animals. The facility had to relocate temporarily during construction. Thirty-eight dogs and 
eleven cats were housed there at the time of the exercise. The temporary facility, about five 
miles away, had been set up during the preceding week. The relocation provided an 
opportunity for a disaster training exercise. The exercise had three goals. The first was to 
establish a model operational structure for use in the evacuation of shelters, boarding 
kennels, veterinary hospitals, and similar facilities. The second was to establish the logistical 
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needs in such incidents. The third goal was to identify concepts and issues for incorporation 
into statewide protocols used by animal control officers and emergency responders. I took 
extensive notes about what went well or poorly and participated in the debriefing following 
the exercise (see Irvine, unpublished paper). 
The scenario for the exercise was that an explosion had occurred at a natural gas 
facility within a few blocks of the shelter. The building sustained minor damage during the 
explosion and lost utilities, but remained structurally sound. However, the fire department 
and engineers ordered the evacuation of all animals during repairs. The aim was to relocate 
all dogs and cats while maintaining kennel records and any medications. Because the building 
was sound, there was no immediate time pressure to evacuate the animals. Nevertheless, the 
intention of the exercise was to evacuate them as quickly and safely as possible. Animal 
control officers and a representative from the State Animal Response Team were in 
command of the incident. A few of those involved in evacuating the animals were affiliated 
with the shelter or with the State Animal Response Team. However, some volunteers came 
from a local training program for veterinary technicians.  
At the start of the exercise, Incident Commanders provided detailed instructions 
about how to handle, house, and transport animals so that correct identification remained 
with each animal. Volunteers evacuated all animals from the building and situated them in 
temporary housing in two hours and fifteen minutes. Considering that none of the 
volunteers had previously experienced a true emergency evacuation, and had received only a 
short briefing beforehand, the evacuation was notably smooth. During the debriefing after 
the exercise, the team discussed some minor problems that had easy solutions. However, a 




The volunteers from the veterinary technician program had ample experience handling 
companion animals, but had no experience with shelter animals, for whom the handling protocols 
differ significantly. For instance, most shelters know little about the history, health, and 
temperaments of the animals in their care. Consequently, to control disease and prevent 
bites, fights, and injuries, shelter workers avoid having dogs encounter one another nose-to-
nose. During the exercise, a bottleneck occurred at an exit station. Dogs and volunteers 
crowded into a narrow hallway, and two dogs began to fight. This particular fight ended 
quickly, but it could have resulted in serious injury to volunteers and dogs. A second incident 
occurred when a semi-feral cat escaped from her kennel at the temporary facility. 
Unaccustomed to handling unsocialized cats, the volunteer had turned away to check some 
paperwork and left the cage open. This, too, could have resulted in human and animal injury. 
Because of bite quarantine policies and the attendant re-evaluation of adoption status, a bite 
inflicted during the recovery of an escaped animal could even result in the animal’s death. 
Both incidents point out the need for situation-specific training for all volunteers. This issue 
translates well to animal rights activism. Although screening and training are often time-
consuming, the trust and confidence that come from having everyone “on the same page” 




The recent attention paid to the needs of animals in disasters points out what I have 
elsewhere referred to as the paradox of progression (Irvine 2003). The phrase captures how one 
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social problem develops into new problems or “piggybacks” new versions onto existing 
ones. For example, an ongoing problem for companion animals in disasters is displacement. 
In Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina, abandoned and stray animals caused additional disasters. 
However, when animal evacuation plans succeed, as they did in Hurricane Charley, the 
problem is no longer displaced animals but fears about “dangerous dog packs.” The current 
solution to that problem—shooting suspicious strays—is clearly unacceptable. Thus, the new 
problem becomes one of disabusing law enforcement and the public of the notion that dog 
packs pose a serious threat. Similarly, emergency responders face the “problem” of SUVs. 
The solution has been to create a position within the ICS to convey information to the 
public about how they can help. The problem then becomes one of what kind of information to 
convey, as the potential for negative public relations is high. The SUV problem might some 
day be resolved, raising new concerns. At present, though, it remains a pitfall for all 
situations involving animal handling.  
By some standards, the future for animals in disasters is improving. Hurricane 
Katrina brought public awareness to the need to include animals in response plans, and it is 
unlikely that the public will ever again be ordered to evacuate without companion animals. 
However, by other standards, the fate of animals has changed little, and may even have taken 
a step backward. Including animals in response plans means they will likely suffer from the 
same bungling and corruption that characterized the Gulf Coast response. The animal 
response will remain in the hands of welfare organizations, while these organizations and 
their largely volunteer staff will remain at the mercy of a quasi-military authority structure. In 
short, current efforts to include animals only incorporate them into a flawed system. 
One solution would be to consider alternatives to the ICS. However, because the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 mandated ICS as part of the national emergency response 
system, change is unlikely. In any case, alternatives would almost certainly incorporate the 
“humans first” speciesism endemic in our culture at-large. If ICS is here to stay, emergency 
planners must ensure that rescuers, companion animal guardians, and other animal 
stakeholders understand its structure and, most importantly, are included in it. One positive 
step would involve recognizing animal rights and welfare organizations as first responders, 
akin to police and fire fighters, and granting them the same access to restricted areas. 
Another step would involve an extensive public awareness campaign, designed to educate 
citizens about the emergency response system before the next disaster occurs. The most 
important step is for activists, educators, and others to continue to call attention to the 
speciesism that commodifies animals, thereby allowing us to put them at risk in disasters. At 
the very least, we must encourage responsible guardianship, which would include assessing 
the risks animals may face by living with us.  
Finally, this paper has not addressed the plight of the millions of farmed animals, 
who are at even greater risk than are companion animals in disasters. Confinement feeding 
operations offer no chance for escape from flood, fire, or structural damage. The farmers 
who feed the animals do so by contract with large corporations who manage dozens of 
production facilities. Because the farmers do not own the animals, they cannot legally 
authorize or conduct rescue operations. In addition, the sheer numbers of birds and animals 
in a typical facility pose numerous logistical problems, such as transportation and re-housing. 
Saving the lives of farmed animals often costs more than the monetary value of the animals’ 
lives. The risks to farmed animals in disasters present one more reason for eliminating 
intensive agricultural practices.  
Some researchers point out that all disasters are human-caused, because we choose 
to live, work, and play in disaster-prone areas. As we incorporated animals into human 
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society, we also exposed them to hazards. Because companion animals share our homes, 
they face the same risks from fire, weather, and other hazards that might cause injury, 
threaten lives, or require evacuation. We are therefore responsible for their welfare. 
However, in disaster responses, human lives have priority. Although an evaluation of the 
justifications for this moral decision lies beyond the scope of this paper, the decision itself 
implies that we cannot save animals as well as humans. The kinds of policies that would 
value all lives would challenge the dualistic thinking behind the simplistic categories of 
“humans” and “animals.” Activists must continually challenge speciesism, wherever it 
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1 VMAT is deployed to areas of federally declared disasters upon request. States can request VMAT assistance 
in other emergencies, but have to pay the full cost of deployment. Local veterinarians perform most veterinary 
services in emergencies/disasters with VMAT deployments being only in the extraordinary situations. 
2 For additional criticisms of this approach, see Dynes 1983; Mileti 1989; Schneider 1992. 
3 The Louisiana State University School of Veterinary Medicine’s large animal program cared for the 350 horses 
also housed at Lamar-Dixon. 
4 The staging area for the Mississippi animal response was located in Hattiesburg.  
5 The exception to this was in Hattiesburg, MS, where the HSUS had established a “pet-friendly” shelter for 
evacuees and their companion animals.  
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6 The LA-SPCA provides care and basic medical services for approximately 11,000 homeless and unwanted 
animals each year. Before the hurricane struck, the LA-SPCA shelter staff had transferred their animals to other 
shelters, in accordance with its disaster response plan. The animals housed in its counterpart in Mississippi, the 
Humane Society of South Mississippi, in Gulfport, were rescued on September 2. 




ml> 3 July 2006 
8 For additional, and similar, reports from Lamar-Dixon, see  
<http://animalliberationfront.com/News/2005_9/KatrinaHSUSprobs.htm> 4 July 2006 
9 In all fairness, many media accounts document that individual responders wanted to rescue animals, but the 
overall policy of disaster response is “people first.” 
10 For my views on this, see Irvine 2004b. 
11 The evacuation zone included three dairies, and all livestock animals were also left behind.  
12 In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, news photos showed white residents “finding” bread and food and 
African Americans “looting” a grocery store. See <http://www.nowpublic.com/node/18075> 3 July 2006  
13 For a list of common myths about direct action, see 
<http://animalliberationfront.com/ALFront/DirectActionMyths.htm> 6 July 2006 
